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Sir William Ryrie
I had some responsibility, for over two years, for
managing the British aid programme. I confess there
were times when I wondered cynically whether anyone
can really 'manage' that programme. One learns
quickly that there are an awful lot of people who think
they should have a hand in how the aid programme
should be spent and that decisions are not taken
independently by the Minister for Overseas Develop-
ment or the Permanent Secretary or the ODA. They
are taken within the folds of collective responsibility in
government.
In that respect, our decisions were no different from
those of other parts of government which is, after all, a
network of competing interests and responsibilities,
reflecting competing interests within the nation. The
reconciliation of these is the business of government.
The money we spend is taxpayers' money and there are
many taxpayers with many interests. This must be so
for everyone who runs an official aid programme in
any country. But something depends on how the
administration of the aid programme is organised. In
some countries, it is given to an executive agency, like
the Swedish SIDA and the Canadian CIDA. Hiving
off responsibility in this way no doubt means that the
influence of politicians is diminished as compared
with our system where a Minister is always directly in
charge, whether the aid administration is a part of the
Foreign Office, coming under the Foreign Secretary as
at present, or a separate Ministry, as it had been under
Labour Governments. Patterns vary from one country
to another, but in any country decisions about how aid
resources should be spent, as well as about the total
size of the aid programme, are subject to political and
commercial pressures in some degree. That is not only
inevitable but right.
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Obviously aid serves various purposes. There is no
doubt about the fundamental purpose - in our case
enshrined in the statute under which we operate: the
development of poor countries. But I regard it as our
business to try to achieve this objective in ways which
also, so far as possible, serve British political and
commercial interests. The aid programme must have
the support of more than the relatively narrow
constituency of idealistic people who are concerned
about the poor, vitally important as that group is. I
reject the view that the ODA should be concerned only
with developmental objectives, leaving the Diplomatic
Wing of the Foreign Office to speak for the political
and the Department of Trade and Industry for the
commercial. That would be an abdication. Of course
we were involved in constant dialogue with the rest of
the Foreign Office, the Department of Trade and
(never to be forgotten) the Treasury. But if the
managers of the programme, the ODA, are to
maintain the lead in deciding how aid money should
be spent we must be concerned with all the objectives
of the aid programme.
Political and Commercial Objectives
What political objectives should the aid programme
serve? They are often ill-defined: making friends,
buying and keeping influence. What is it that has these
effects? The announcement of new offers of aid,
especially unexpected offers or more-than-expected
offers - the gratitude effect? But once aid has become
an established fact, the gratitude effect is hard to find,
and the political damage which follows when aid is
reduced often seems greater than the gains when it is
increased. Moreover, the gratitude effect, when it is
found, often seems to last at most about 24 hours. So
we in the ODA tended to think that the political
benefits of aid have to be seen in the longer term the
building up of influence which stems from a fairly
substantial and continuing flow of aid; and, more
fundamentally, the political gains which can be had
through contributing to growth, good government
and stability in certain areas.
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How do we make the aid programme serve
commercial interests? The general rule is that all off-
shore procurement financed from British bilateral aid
(as opposed to local cost expenditure) is tied to British
sources. Of course this policy has costs. There are
cases where it is more expensive and less satisfactory to
buy British, although we did try to direct aid
particularly towards the types of goods and services
where the UK is competitive. And where the difference
is especially great or non-British elements are
obviously desirable, we could be flexible. But without
this tying of British aid expenditure to British supply
we would weaken the support in the country for the
aid programme as a whole. If the price of removing
this bit of protectionism were less aid, that would
probably not be a net gain to the developing countries.
Besides this, there is the Aid and Trade Provision or
the ATP, the British mechanism for providing aid in
the form of mixed credits, where aid is linked with
ordinary export finance. The borderline between aid
to developing countries and aid to British industry is
sometimes hard to find. The philosophy underlying
the arrangement is that the two can be reconciled, and
so they can; but our experience of this programme is
that business pressures grow and the emphasis tends to
shift towards the interests of exporters. I am glad that
there is now an increasing recognition of the dangers
of an unrestricted mixed credit race in the world. This
must be kept within bounds and, difficult as it is, we
are trying to promote moves towards better
international regulation to restrain it.
Another way in which the aid programme can be used
for commercial purposes is when it is made the servant
of a kind of industrial policy. But there have been cases
where we have been pressed to agree to employing
particular British firms as contractors in order to help
etablish them in a certain market and give them certain
experience. Sometimes it works, sometimes it does
not. We obviously have to be very careful when it is
proposed to use aid money in this way.
Allocating the Aid Programme
In managing- the aid programme, there has to be a
system for allocation. In the UK, unlike many other
countries, the 'aid programme' includes all our
combinations to international organisations, not least
our share of European Community aid experience
(which is partly financed from our vote and partly
'attributed' to the aid programme by the Treasury). So
we are very much involved in basic issues about the
allocation between multilateral and bilateral aid.
We are involved, but in practice the room for
manoeuvre is small. The aid programme as a whole
(and it is this entity which is the subject of annual
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negotiation with the Treasury) is under tight
constraint. It fell by il per cent in real terms from
1979/80 to 1983/84 and is planned to increase over the
next three years by cash amounts which are likely to
mean a small further decline in real terms.2 Within the
total (now about £1.1 bn net) 41 per cent goes on
multilateral aid (as compared with 27 per cent in 1980
and 16 per cent before we joined the European
Community in 1972). This seems likely to rise to
something over 45 per cent over the next three years.
In decisions about multilateral aid, our freedom of
manoeuvre tends to be restricted. In the European
Community, we are parties to collective decisions; and
even in cases where there is a rule of unanimity it is in
practice very difficult to stand out alone against
expenditures which the other members all approve. At
this stage in history, not all the other members of the
Community are so determined to limit public
expenditure, and this affects aid as it does other things.
In the case of IDA and other concessional
international funds, our room for manoeuvre is
limited, largely because expenditure tends to be
determined by decisions taken some years ago; and
although we have reduced our commitments in recent
negotiations, we are still on a rising trend of spending.
Is this to be regretted? It hardly makes sense to talk
generally about whether multilateral aid is good,
better than bilateral aid, or not. It varies enormously.
ODA tends to believe that IDA, administered by the
World Bank, is one of the most efficient means of
channelling resources to the poor countries. ODA
tends not to believe the same of the European
Development Fund, whose methods of project
appraisal, monitoring and financial control are
suspect; let alone of the food aid which accounts for up
to half of European aid and which is frankly more a
means of disposing of European agricultural surpluses
than of helping the poor.
There is a case for exploiting this situation. We might
even increase our share in IDA, on the grounds that
the money is well spent and, moreover, a reasonable
share of it goes on procurement from this country.
Frankly,- if our multilateral proportion stood at 20
instead of 40 per cent we might be more inclined to
take this view - or if the aid programme as a whole
was expanding. But our bilateral country programmes
have fallen by a third in real terms over the last four
years and we expect a further fall of about 18 per cent
over the next three.3 I cannot see any case for trying to
accelerate this process and some strong reasons for
trying to slow it up. Bilateral aid does serve purposes,
2 Since this was written (mid-1984) the trend has somewhat improved
(cd).
See footnote 2 above, however (ed).
political and commercial, which are not served by
contributions to international organisations; and
from a developmental point of view we believe we can
spend the money better than many of the organisations
we contribute to. So Tam in no doubt that we are right,
in present circumstances, to do the best we can to
protect bilateral aid from further erosion.
Allocation to Countries
But in many ways the most interesting and difficult
decisions are about allocation to countries. British aid
to countries (about £500 mn in the current year) is a
drop in the ocean of the global needs of developing
countries; but in another sense it is a significant
amount of money and spending it needs careful
thought and planning.
Tn 1983 we gave aid to 125 countries, and that fact
expresses one problem. We are a medium-sized
industrial country, but our past as a world power tends
to make us think still in terms of a world role. But the
question of concentration or scatter is a real one. Most
of these aid programmes are very small - for
example, in most Francophone and Latin American
countries they consist of a few scholarships or experts
or a bit of English language teaching. There are
probably some political benefits to be had from even
very small programmes of technical assistance in
many countries and, conversely, the financial savings
to be had from cutting out a lot of these programmes
would not add up to much. So I do not regret that we
have a, thin scatter of small programmes. The real
questions are about which countries should get more
substantial amounts of aid. T believe that impact on
development, as well as political and commercial
gains, are maximised if aid is concentrated to some
extent, so that in a certain number of countries -
perhaps a dozen or fifteen - our presence is
substantial and our impact felt. Better in terms of all
our objectives to be No. 1 or 2 in 8 or 10 countries than
No. 6 in 30. But this view is not shared by everyone in
Whitehall.
In any case spending on development projects is a slow
business and changing direction is like turning an oil
tanker around. The geographical pattern of the aid
programme is still influenced by decisions taken when
Mrs. Hart was Minister for Overseas Development in
the Labour Government because a number of large
projects begun in the late l970s are now coming to an
end. So the choices about priorities are not usually
about this year or next, but they have to be made and
in making them we in the ODA recognise three main
criteria.
The first is the relative poverty of countries. The
British view, endorsed, T am glad to say, by both main
parties, is that aid should take the form mainly of
grants and should be concentrated on the poor
countries. Tn 1983, 63 per cent of our aid to countries
went to the 50 poorest countries (and we now find that
the most convenient place to draw the line, rather than
some shifting line of GNP per head). T personally
would like to see the proportion higher still - it was
influenced in 1983 by a number of special cases, such
as aid to Turkey which was undertaken largely for
political reasons, and one or two lumpy ATP projects.
But the policy of concentrating on the 50 poorest does
limit the field. The British record here is a pretty good
one.
Secondly, it is natural that we should concentrate our
aid effort on countries with which we have good
political and commercial links, countries with which
we communicate easily. Of course this takes us
towards the Commonwealth and T think we need make
no apology for that. Tn 1983,73 per cent of our country
aid went to the Commonwealth. We are not the only
aid donor in the world and our distribution can be
influenced by what others are doing. We naturally
operate most effectively in countries where English is
spoken and where systems of administration are akin
to our own. Not all our priority countries are in the
Commonwealth but there are enough such countries
which meet our other criteria to take up a very large
part of our aid.
Thirdly, we try to give priority to countries where our
aid can be effective. Now that is not an easy thing to
judge. Effectiveness can be influenced by many
factors, but a key one is the context of economic and
development policy. We work mainly through
governments, as an official aid programme is bound to
do. This means that the effectiveness of the aid
depends very much on whether our contribution fits
into sensible and well-administered development
policies, sound general economic policies and sound
policies for particular sectors.
There are countries who would qualify under my first
two headings but where we are not satisfied that
substantial amounts of aid will not, in effect, be
wasted. Tanzania provides an interesting example. In
1980 ODA supported the building of a major new road
in southern Tanzania. The area to be linked by the new
road to the main highway system and towns of
Tanzania is one of high agricultural potential. The
calculation showed a reasonable economic rate of
return. We built in a review point half-way through the
scheme and the calculations were done again. This
time they showed a lower return, because Tanzanian
policies, with depressed producer prices and an
exorbitantly over-valued exchange rate, meant that
the agricultural potential of the area was much less
likely to be realised, so the value of the road was less.
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In fact, we decided to finish the road, partly because
we thought it reasonable to take a longer-term view,
and partly because of being afraid of looking
ridiculous by leaving a half-built road in the bush.
Aid effectiveness can also be a matter of the efficiency
of the institutions with which we have to deal. We are
reluctant to put aid into a railway system which is
badly managed and heavily subsidised. It also, of
course, involves judgements about the likely continuing
value of the aid. When we build a road, for example,
we have to take an interest in what arrangements there
will be for maintaining it afterwards.
Allocation by Sectors
So much for allocation between countries. But there
are also many decisions to be taken about priorities
within countries - agriculture or infrastructure,
health care or balance of payments support,
manpower or capital? In 1983, 31 per cent of our
bilateral aid was spent on agriculture and natural
resources, 43 per cent on infrastructure and energy,
10 per cent on education. But these figures are not the
result of any decision to allocate given sums of money
globally to these things. It would be an administrative
nightmare to apply a policy of sectoral allocations,
cutting across the country allocations. It would mean
sub-dividing each country allocation into amounts for
agriculture, education or what-have-you and most of
our desk officers would resign. Broadly speaking, the
allocation between sectors is the consequence of
judgements made country by country in consultation
with recipient governments.
But that is not the whole story. Choices between
sectors are influenced by broad views which we
develop in the ODA about what the priority needs of
developing countries are, which is of course a subject
on which there is much discussion between donors,
recipient governments, international organisations
and academics and research workers.
At the same time our choice of sectors is also
influenced by another factor: in what sectors is the UK
best placed to meet the needs of developing countries?
Do we have good, competitive firms to provide the
goods or do the work cost-effectively? Do we have
special centres of knowledge and expertise which can
make a contribution? In some areas, the UK is, I think,
better placed to help than in others and there is much
to be said for concentrating on these.
Bringing these two strands - needs and our ability to
supply - together suggests that in current circum-
stances five areas deserve particular attention, namely,
agriculture, infrastructure, education, manpower and
health.
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First, there is agriculture and related areas (livestock,
forestry, fisheries). This is basic to development in
most countries. Moreover this is the area in which
there is often most scope for rapid improvements in
productivity and so the best prospect of improving the
standards of living of poor people widely. Agriculture
is about organisation more than it is about investment.
It means getting a lot of aspects of government
organisation and the environment within which
farmers work right, then allowing farmers to get on
with the job. It is about pricing, the supply of fertiliser
and seed, credit for small farmers, water, research into
new varieties and farming methods, roads and other
forms of transport, marketing arrangements.
This is not an area in which donors can achieve
anything without the closest cooperation with
recipient governments. Great strides have been made
in many countries in Asia. Africa is far behind, but the
potential for the improvement of agricultural
productivity is enormous and this must be a priority,
although that does not necessarily mean that it must
claim the largest amount of money. And we must be
prepared to sustain the effort over a long period.
The world of tropical agriculture and research in
particular is of course one in which a good deal of
knowledge and experience has been built up in this
country in the past, although that comparative
advantage may be fading a little now. Scientific
brainpower has for decades been concentrated much
more on temperate agriculture. That is changing and it
is now more widely recognised that applying
brainpower to tropical agriculture can produce great
gains. We are strong supporters, in money and staff, of
the Consultative Group for International Agricultural
Research which runs a number of important research
institutions around the world, and there are
supporting activities in this country - at the
Universities of Reading and Nottingham, for example,
and at the Centre for Tropical Veterinary Medicine in
Edinburgh. Within the ODA we have the Tropical
Development and Research Institute and the Land
Resources Development Centre.
Secondly, infrastructure will always be a major part of
the programme, including transport and energy. This
is basic to economic progress and is the responsibility
of governments, so very suitable for official aid. But
we are increasingly aware that better economic returns
can now be secured by restoring or maintaining
existing capital assets rather than building new ones.
So even in this field there is not necessarily a need for
huge new capital investment. But that is sometimes
needed and this is the part of the aid programme which
brings the most obvious commercial and employment
benefits to the UK. This too is an area in which Britain
has something to contribute - there are many British
companies with skills and experience in the building of
roads, railways, power stations, dams, water and
irrigation systems in tropical countries.
Thirdly, education must always be high on the British
list of priorities. But what kind of assistance should we
give to education? The contribution we can best make
from abroad varies according to the country and the
sector. In primary and secondary education it is
usually best concentrated on organisation, planning
and management, rather than the provision of
teachers. More direct help, in the form of staff, is often
appropriate for technical and higher education. Partly
because of our imperial past we are well equipped to
contribute in the whole of this field, and our help is
very much wanted by many developing countries.
Fourthly, there is manpower, especially for government
departments, parastatal organisations and all sorts of
public sector activities. This is a desperate need in
many countries, especially in Africa. Both we and
newly independent governments have been naive in
our belief in the ability of African countries to take
over and run all these activities efficiently within a
decade or two of independence. We now recognise
that we must take a much longer view of needs in this
area. But priority in our aid programme in Africa (and
some countries elsewhere) is to help in the efficient
running of key institutions in the development of the
country. Manpower aid has to be reshaped, targeted
on particular institutions, set in the context of long-
run plans, and directed at new and future needs and
not just at maintaining existing staff.
Again our historic connections with Commonwealth
countries in particular, and the enormous interest in
Africa and Asia which still exists in this country, mean
that we are as well equipped as any western donor to
provide help in this form. Most Commonwealth
countries of Africa have come through a period after
independence when they wanted to Africanise
everything. They are now much more aware of the
deficiencies of their manpower and the weaknesses of
many of their institutions and anxious to have our help
in this field.
Fifthly, there is health. In the British list of priorities
this has traditionally come rather low. In 1983 only
2 per cent of the bilateral aid programme was spent on
health. The argument has been that our resources are
scarce and that the first priority should be to build up
the economic strength of developing countries, after
which they will be able to provide better medical
services themselves. There is something to be said for
this approach; but we cannot always sacrifice the
present for the future. Within the field of health, the
current tendency is to put heavy emphasis on primary
health care and preventive medicine rather than on
large hospitals. Perhaps even this fashion can go too
far. We cannot altogether forget the hospital sector.
This area troubles me. It is not a high priority within
our aid programme, although there is outstanding
expertise and knowledge in this country. We have two
of the finest centres of research into tropical diseases in
the world in London and Liverpool. With our limited
resources it is hard to see ways in which we can channel
this particular talent more in meeting the needs of
recipient countries. We may have to think more of
informal and unofficial links between hospitals in this
country and those abroad if we are to exploit this
resource to the full.
Systems of Control and Allocation
How do we take decisions on these things in practice?
In the ODA, it is through three administrative
mechanisms.
First, the basic process of allocating the aid
programme takes place through a rolling plan (we call
it the Aid Framework) which contains firm planning
figures for year one and indicative figures for the two
later years. The plan is reviewed and rolled forward
annually. In mid 1984 we were working on the plan for
the three years beginning with 1985-86. The process
begins in the ODA and is then expanded to involve the
whole of the Foreign Office, the Department of Trade
and Industry and the Treasury, officials and Ministers.
We do not publish this plan and though that may
shock some advocates of open government, there are
good reasons for it. Wehave to work within the UK
Government's system of expenditure control with a
cash limit for each financial year and a cut off at each
31st March. Country programme managers or desk
officers are expected to spend their particular
allocations in the Aid Framework within the financial
year as nearly as possible and to make sure that it is
well spent. Sometimes these two objectives conflict
and we settle for spending less than the plan in country
X rather than wasting money. This is only possible
because the recipient country does not know how
much has been allocated to it. If they were told, this
would become an entitlement and we would be under
great pressure either to spend loosely or to make up in
subsequent years for any underspending. The
European Development Fund has got itself deeply
into just these difficulties by a system of known
allocations. The World Bank, on the other hand, has
its own internal system of allocation which is not
known to the Executive Board which represents
member countries, and this gives the management
some freedom of manoeuvre and a greater ability to
insist on conditions.
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Secondly, we have recently introduced an annual
review of our aid programmes in each of the main
countries. The Under-Secretary responsible for each
geographical area produces a paper which reviews the
economic and political situation in each country, its
development needs and our development programme.
The Diplomatic Wing of the Foreign Office takes a
hand in this process and each paper is then discussed at
a meeting under the chairmanship of the Permanent
Secretary of ODA. These meetings produce con-
clusions about the priorities which, after they have
been approved by the Minister, become the marching
orders for the geographical departments and desk
officers in the ODA. But this review process does not
result in precise decisions about individual projects.
These decisions will be taken case by case as the year
goes on, the Treasury and the Department of Trade
and Industry being consulted wherever necessary.
Complementing these country reviews, we have
instituted a system of sectoral reviews whïch is still
experimental. Papers are produced for discussion
amongst senior management in the ODA about aid to
agriculture, education, health, transport, energy,
water, small scale industry and population pro-
grammes. The papers are a combined effort by the
specialist advisers in each field and the economists.
The purpose is to make sure that sectoral thinking
about developing country needs and the British ability
to supply is not suppressed by a system which gives
priority to country needs.
Thirdly, and most important, there is the system which
we have been developing over many years of project
and programme appraisal governing all spending
decisions. All proposals must of course fall within the
framework plan (or exceptionally be financed from
our contingency reserve). Those involving an
expenditure of more than £1.5 mn are submitted to a
Projects Committee chaired by the Deputy Secretary.
The appraisal documents must demonstrate that the
proposal has been examined rigorously from all points
of view but especially regarding its potential
contribution to development. Where an economic rate
of return can be calculated this is done, or an
assessment of cost-effectiveness is made. This is the
filter through which all important spending decisions
have to pass. Proposals which are put to the Projects
Committee will be very detailed and include questions
about the technical feasibility of the proposals;
environmental and social considerations; conditions
to be attached to the assistance; the nature of any
contracts with suppliers; and arrangements for
monitoring and supervision and for financing and
procurement. Those projects which pass the test and
are recommended for approval by the Committee are
then submitted through the Permanent Secretary to
the Minister for approval.
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Getting the Money Spent
Allocation is important but it is only the beginning of
the process and a great deal of life in the ODA consists
of getting the money spent. Like other aid
organisations we have to find ways of bringing
together the contributions of administrative and
financial people on the one hand and specialists on the
other. Our system gives the lead clearly to
geographical departments, so far as the country
programmes are concerned, with our specialist
advisers 'brigaded' with them, assigned to areas and
countries and working closely alongside the admini-
strators. We went over to this system of attachment of
advisers to geographical departments a few years ago
and it is working well. In fact, although we call them
'advisers', the specialist staff are in practice much
more than this when it comes to the design and
monitoring of projects.
This applies even more in the outposts which we have
in various regions, known as Development Divisions
- two in Africa, one in South East Asia, one in the
Caribbean and one in the Pacific. They consist of
interdisciplinary teams working very closely together
on project identification and appraisal and on the
monitoring of projects once they start.
A basic principle in the administration of the country
programmes is that the responsibility for the
expenditure lies with Ambassadors and High
Commissioners. Formally, Development Divisions
are advisers to them. It is not surprising that this
relationship is a variable one. There are sometimes
frictions and personalities can make a difference, but
in practice it works reasonably well and in my view it is
on balance an advantage, from a purely administrative
point of view, that the ODA is part of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, working under the same
political master, the Foreign Secretary.
Other Aid Expenditure
There is more to aid than country programmes and
multilateral contributions. For example, there is a
subvention to the British Council, which gets about
one-third of its core funding from the ODA to finance
its activities in developing countries, besides acting as
our agent in administering aid programmes in training
and education. There is the Commonwealth Develop-
ment Corporation, again funded by us, a sort of
private sector arm of the aid programme. There is a lot
of expenditure on research, some of it within the ODA
itself, especially in the Tropical Development and
Research Institute, some of it in universities and
institutes up and down the country, and some of it in
international institutes, which I have mentioned.
There is the whole voluntary sector; the British
Volunteer Programme receives about 90 percent of its
funds from the ODA, and plays a significant part in
British manpower aid. There are the arrangements for
joint funding of small development projects through
organisations like Oxfam and Christian Aid, organi-
sations which bring something unique to the aid effort,
an ability, very often, to get closer to the needs of very
poor people than is possible through the official aid
programme. There is even the academic world and the
Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University.
Here, as elsewhere, financial pressures have brought
about change in the last five years and the IDS now
raises about half its income from sources other than
ODA, mostly by selling its services to overseas
governments and aid agencies; but the contribution
from the aid programme is still significant. It is one
more example of the wide and varied interest to be
found in the UK in the affairs of developing countries
which is so great a support for those who are
responsible for managing the aid programme.
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